
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sharp increase in enemy military activity in Korea, the Communists have not yet undertaken on a large scale many of the preparations which heretofore immediately preceded major offensives. On the basis of available indications alone, therefore, it is unlikely that the Communists will undertake a large-scale ground offensive in the immediate future (within the next two weeks).

- 3. The overall increase in Communist capabilities and the recent step-up in Communist military activity suggests the follow-ing possible short-range intentions: (a) to carry out a normal relief of front-line units; (b) to prepare for a major Communist offensive in the future; (c) to strengthen defenses in anticipation of a UN attack; or (d) to exert pressure on the armistice discussions.
- 4. Communist conduct of cease-fire discussions in recent weeks provide no positive indications of immediate Communist intentions. There are no reliable indications that the Communists anticipate an early armistice. Their military activity appears to be inconsistent with the conclusion of an early armistice except insofar as it may be designed to influence the discussions.
- 5. On balance and taking into account broad Soviet and Chinese Communist objectives, we still believe that the Communists



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desire at least a continuation of the armistice discussions, if not a satisfactory settlement. We believe, therefore, that they are unlikely to endanger continued discussions by launching a large-scale air offensive. However, they may feel it possible to undertake a ground offensive in an effort to regain territory north of the 38th parallel without serious risk of a break-off of negotiations.

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#### DISCUSSION

### I. COMMUNIST CAPABILITIES IN KOREA

- 6. Since the instigation of the armistice negotiations, the Communists have substantially increased their capabilities in Korea. They have replaced their losses, re-equipped their units, reorganized their forces, re-trained their troops, and re-disposed their forces. There has been a steady build-up in the strength of the ground forces to the present estimate of 875,000 personnel. Qualitative improvement has accompanied the quantitative build-up; there have been very significant additions of armor and artillery; the fire power of all units has been substantially increased.
- 7. The Communists have made excellent use of the long period of fairly static operations to increase their logistical potential. Although this quiet period has required decreased amounts of many types of supplies during the past nine months, the Communists have continued throughout this period with an apparently maximum effort to bring up supplies. As a result the Communist logistical situation, despite continued air and naval attacks by UN forces, is far better than at any time since the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea.
- 8. The enemy ground forces presently in contact could attack with very little warning and could be reinforced within a short time

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by the remaining enemy forces in Korea. It is estimated that the Communists have the logistic capability to maintain the momentum of an offensive for from 5 to 10 days.

- 9. The capabilities of the Communist Air Force in the Korean area have improved steadily and rapidly. Airfield development in Manchuria has been undertaken on a large scale; a well-integrated system of air control and warning has been established, and Communist pilots have been engaged in an intensive training program which has included combat experience.
- 10. An air offensive could be launched at any time. This offensive could include an initial commitment of over 500 Mig-15's as well as substantial numbers of piston-engined fighters and light bombers. An attack of this nature might inflict serious damage upon UN ground forces, naval and air installations, and lines of communication.

## II. INDICATIONS OF COMMUNIST MILITARY INTENTIONS IN KOREA

#### A. Ground

ll. For the first time in several months there are indications of a possibly significant redispositioning of Communist forces in Korea.

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- a. The forward movement of two Communist armies, one towards the western sector and one towards the central sector, has been accepted. The movement of three other CCF armies toward the western sector has been reported and is considered probable.
- b. In the eastern sector, reports of PW's and other information point to the possibility of a forward movement of armor from the Wonsan area, suggesting that elements of the CCF 3rd Armored Division may have been displaced southward. Several PW reports have also referred to an expected southward movement of the North Korean V Corps.

These reported movements point to an increase in Communist troop, armor, and artillery strength within operational distance of the front.

- 12. During the past few weeks there has been an increase in the number of PW reports of a new offensive. Within the last two weeks, two Communist PW's referred to an enemy offensive to be launched "when it is warmer" or "if the peace talks fail." Another vague report states the North Korean V Corps is expected to move southward to launch an attack during May.
- 13. Other PV's, however, have continued to refer to enemy defensive plans, including the strengthening of defense fortifications



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and the rotation of front-line units. The possibility that the enemy is preparing for a relief of some front-line units is further suggested by PW reports that the CCF 67th Army will relieve the 68th Army and that the CCF 25th Army is to be relieved in the immediate future. There is still no confirmation, however, that the relief of any front-line units is as yet under way.


It. There has been one recent report that North Korean guerrilla forces are being trained to infiltrate UN lines (a tactic which has preceded previous offensives). This report receives some substantiation from the recent capture by UN forces of a small number of line-crossers. There are low-grade reports that Communist forces are being issued summer uniforms unusually early and that new Soviet rifles have been issued to some units.

## B. Air

15. The most significant recent development with respect to enemy air activity and one which might foreshadow increased employment of enemy air forces, was a visual sighting on 13 April of 450 jet aircraft on Tatungkon airfield and 50 on Antung airfield. This is double the number of aircraft ever before sighted on these airfields and very nearly the total estimated Mig-15 strength in Manchuria. Although an error of up to 75 aircraft in this sighting is

is possible, full credence is given to this report. Within five hours this concentration had disappeared and subsequent operations during the day disclosed a total of approximately 200 aircraft on both fields. Possible explanations for this concentration are that bad weather precluded the use of other Manchurian airfields or that this was a test of personnel and facilities under crowded conditions. It is also possible that this represented a "show of force" designed to influence the armistice discussions. The concentration is also significant as an indicator of Communist capabilities to repair and replace aircraft. During the past six weeks Communist losses in combat totaled 62 Migs destroyed, 14 probably destroyed, and 95 damaged, the equivalent of over four regiments. Since Communist non-combat operations losses would probably increase significantly these loss totals, and since the number of planes sighted indicates that overall jet fighter strength is being maintained, it appears that the Communists have an effective repair and replacement system,

16. Despite the observed concentration of aircraft on the Yalu River airfields, on 15 April, only 132 aircraft were seen airborne over Korea on that date and Communist air activity during April is about 60 percent of that observed during a comparable period in March. Enemy losses so far in April exceed those for the entire month of March but at the same time enemy pilots have shown an



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increasing willingness to engage UN aircraft and UN losses have increased to some extent.

17. Another indication that the enemy may be preparing for increased air activity, possibly including air operations over South Korea on a large scale, was the reported observation on 1 April of a Mig-15 over the Scoul-Suwon area on what appeared to be a photo-reconnaissance flight.

## III. STATUS OF ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

18. There has been no real progress in the cease-fire discussions in recent weeks and no indication that the Communists have changed their attitude on any of the basic issues of disagreement. The Communists have again intimated that they might be willing to withdraw their demand for the inclusion of the USSR as a neutral observer in return for the right to build airfields. After a recess of several days to recheck the PW lists, the Communists on 13 April asked for a resumption of the secret talks on this question. Communist propaganda, however, continued to offer no hints that a concession on the question of voluntary repatriation was to be expected. The Peiping radio, quoting a dispatch on a Communist correspondent in Korea, reiterated the Communist contention that the principle of voluntary repatriation was a violation of the Gensva

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Convention and accused the UN of torturing prisoners to sign petitions against return to Communist hands. An earlier statement of the Communist commanders that returned prisoners would be immune from reprisals for anti-Communist activity has received little subsequent attention in Communist propaganda.